The quantum mechanical wave-particle dualism is analyzed and criticized, in the framework of Reichenbach's concepts of phenomenon and interphenomenon. It is suggested that the dual pictures be de-emphasized in the study of quantum theory, and that a qualitative picture of atomic processes need not make use of them. In this connection we stress a view of the electron and other such "particles" as having discontinuous spatiality in time: they only have a place or a shape when they participate in a phenomenon.
INTRODUCTION
Textbooks on quantum mechanics typically begin by discussing the wave-particle dualism in its extreme aspects: such processes are best described in the particle picture, such other in the wave picture. Some texts, like Schiff's [1] , for example, do then present a strictly correct, but too succinct "quantum mechanical viewpoint." After this the mathematical formalism is developed, and only occasionally the qualitative aspects of the theory are touched upon. It is left to the student the not-so-easy task of integrating the qualitative and quantitative fundamentals of quantum theory into a logically coherent, intuitive picture of the atomic world.
In the present paper we first make an analysis and criticism of the concept of dualism. Our purpose is to sharply expose the artificiality and non-uniqueness of both the wave and the particle pictures. To our knowledge the best analysis of the quantum mechanical dualism is that of H. Reichenbach, 
in his book
Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics [2] . We are therefore guided by Reichenbach's ideas in our study of the meaning of the wave-particle dualism.
Second, and more important, we want to advocate a qualitative picture of microscopic reality, which is consistent with the more abstract interpretation of quantum mechanics. (As is well known, this interpretation assigns physical reality to observable facts only.) The key to our preferred language is to abandon thinking of micro-objects -we shall deal with electrons for definiteness -as having permanent spatiality; that is, as having spatial properties at all times. For instance, the question "Where is the electron when it is not observable?" is meaningless, since the electron by definition does not have a place when it does not participate in an observable phenomenon. (This meaninglessness is not a mere consequence of unobservability. It is rather a matter of adequate definition.)
In Section 2 we introduce Reichenbach's ideas of phenomenon and interphenomenon, as a basis for the discussion of the wave-particle dualism. In Sec. 3 we present the alternative language, which pre-empties micro-objects such as electrons or photons of classical-like spatial attributes (such as temporal continuity of position or shape, trajectory, propagation). We try to make it clear that there is no real need for such attributes in micro-objects. Next (Sec. 4) we apply both viewpoints -i.e., those of Sections 2 and 3 -to a physical example. We call the reader's attention to the fact that physics progresses by increasing degrees of abstraction. Concluding remarks are made in the last Section.
REICHENBACH'S CONCEPTS OF PHE-NOMENON AND INTERPHENOMENON
Reichenbach (p. 21 of [2] ) defines phenomena as "occurrences which are so easily inferable from macroscopic data that they may be considered observable in a wider sense." [3] . In the same page he rightly points out that the phenomena are ... determinate in the same sense as the unobserved objects of classical physics. As a matter of fact, physicists are not troubled by the question of the reality of observable-but-unobserved events, no more than by the question of the reality of unobserved trees. As R. P. Feynman puts it: "Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not." [5] In other words, the concept of phenomenon supposes "Berkeley's problem" solved. (A satisfactory solution is given by A. J. Ayer [4] .) Interphenomena are "occurrences ... constructed in the form of an interpolation within the world of phenomena" (p. 21 of [2] ). They are logical constructs similar to phenomena, usable to fill the gaps in the world of phenomena, so that the whole have an appearance of continuity in time. Notice that this is a purely mental process! It is precisely this process that we intend to dispose of, as will be seen below.
Next, Reichenbach says that "the distinction between phenomena and interphenomena [is] the quantum mechanical analogue of the distinction between observed and unobserved things" (p. 21). This analogy is somewhat misleading, because the relation between phenomena and interphenomena is not so simple as that between observed and unobserved macro-objects. If one likes labels, we suggest calling the question of interphenomena "Berkeley's problem of the second degree": formerly we had to construct objects out of actual or expected sense-experiences; here one has to define entities related to experience only through its end points (initial and final events).
After these preliminaries, we might say that the particle and wave pictures in quantum theory represent different choices of interphenomena. In the former, the gap between, say, two consecutive electron appearances (two "happenings," or phenomena, involving the electron) is filled by an imagined trajectory (interphenomena!) traveled by the electron (imagined as a point-like object). With wave-like interphenomena, on the other hand, the same gap if filled by imagining the first phenomenon as a disturbance in a medium, then a wave-like propagation of the disturbance, and finally a quick coalescing of the wave into another point-like disturbance.
THE IDEA OF DISCONTINUOUS SPATIAL-ITY
The considerations of the preceding Section will be illustrated by an example in the next Section. Here we want to counter the dualistic view with what we consider a more rational and satisfactory picture [11] . The point is this: there is no need for interphenomena. Beween two consecutive, observable events nothing happens to the electron. During this time interval the electron is nowhere, it is out of space. One is not allowed to say that it has as "indefinite position" somewhere in the neighborhood of the events. Contrarily to the situation with macroscopic things, micro-objects like electrons do not constantly occupy a place, they have a place only when they appear. Electrons have a permanent potentiality to interact (charge) and hence to appear in space, but no permanent spatiality [6] . In other words, its spatiality is limited, or discontinuous in time. We hope to make this point clearer in next Section.
One might object that this picture has the disadvantage of being more abstract than the dual pictures. To this we answer that (1) "abstract" is a relative term: a moment's reflection may convince the reader that the classical concept of trajectory is also quite abstract (though less so than quantum mechanical concepts); and (2) progress in physics has been reached by increasing degrees of abstraction. For example, the abandonment of an ether as the medium of electromagnetic waves. This is only natural, since "concrete" ideas are just those of our too limited, ordinary sense experience.
DIFFRACTION OF AN ELECTRON
Let us now illustrate the problem through an idealized [7] experiment of diffraction of an electron by a slit in a diaphragm [2] . 
A
The above figure is a sketch of the experimental situation: A is the electron source, S is the slit in the diaphragm, and B is the point on the screen where the electron is absorbed. The source is supposed to be so weak that only one electron is emitted at a time. The emission of an electron at A and its absorption at B are point-like events, and are phenomena in the sense defined above. Let us call them process α and process β, respectively. The space and time gap between these phenomena has been filled by Reichenbach with particle-like interphenomena and with wave-like interphenomena, which we shall now discuss. Note that these constructs are not incorrect. They are logically sound, indeed. The point to be emphasized in this paper is rather their artificiality. We claim that it is more illuminating [8] to discard interphenomena altogether, and to consider quantum mechanical objects as entities which do not always occupy space.
Particle-like interphenomena
In this picture the electron is said to be a concentrated lump of matter, which after process α at A travels through space along a straight path from A to S. Then it proceeds along another straight line from S to B, where process β occurs. This is called a normal interpretation, which is another important concept in Reichenbach's analysis: it means that the constructed interphenomena obey physical laws which do not sharply differ from the laws of the observed world of phenomena [2] . (Otherwise it is called an anomalous interpretation. See below.)
Notice that here we can predict the direction the electron will take after passing S only in probability terms: this does not make the interphenomena anomalous, since analogous situations exist in the world of phenomena [9].
Wave-like interphenomena
This picture is less trivial, and more relevant to the present discussion. We say that the electron is a wave-like disturbance of a medium, initiated by phenomenon α at A (this is not an anomaly: the medium has been invented for the support of interphenomena, but its ability to oscillate is normal). Later the wave collapses in order to wholly pass through slit S (anomaly: no such instantaneous collapse exists for real waves). Then the wave propagates from S to the screen, and finally collapses again at B for the production of phenomenon β. Thus we see that the wave-like interpretation is anomalous. But this does not make it wrong. In Reichenbach's theory, it is as true as the particle-like picture. Such anomalies are the price one pays for demanding "filling the gaps" between real events.
The abstract picture
We say that between phenomena α and β nothing happens to the electron. (Needless to say, we have been assuming all along that there is vacuum between the elements sketched in the figure. ) The ψ-function and the rules of quantum theory let us calculate the probability of event β after α has happened, but no spatial picture of inter-events is allowed. The electron has position A when α occurs and position B when β occurs. In between it does not have either place or shape, it has no spatiality.
Exercise
We leave it as an exercise for the reader to make similar discussion for what is known in quantum mechanics as tunneling through a potential barrier [l] . Especially noteworthy is the fact that its particle-like interphenomena have the anomaly of energy non-conservation [2] .
CONCLUSION
Reichenbach's analysis of the wave-particle dualism of quantum mechanics has the great merit of showing that these interpretations are logical constructs, neither unique nor unambiguous for a given physical situation. While in a lower level -i.e., in the case of unobserved facts or objects -similar constructs are very convenient and adequate, because unambiguous and "normal," they are rather restrictive of the imagination in the case of inter-events. We think it is more illuminating to discard the concept of dualism, and to recognize that there is no need to project all ideas of physical theory into space. Space, or more precisely position in space, is in a sense produced by physical phenomena. The macrophysical, persistent continuity of spatial forms is an illusion analogous to many others, for example, the illusion of spatial continuity of macroscopic matter. The proper language of physics is mathematical, and in many cases mathematical statements do not allow for mapping on intuitive space. Thus an electron is a linguistic entity logically similar to common sense objects [4] , but having a much poorer spatial character [10] .
Of course, the language of the wave and particle pictures has heuristic value in problem solving and experiment setting. It is also a practical jargon. We may even say that these pictures have some reality. However, the actual measurements and calculations are expressed in mathematical language, and physicists move so safely in this domain that they may not see how vague are qualitative statements made in terms of the dual pictures.
We cannot propose that the idea of dualism be banned from physics. But we do suggest that students pay more attention to the unrealism of considering an electron as "sometimes a particle and sometimes a wave." The electron is a mathematically defined thing, which has the physical attributes of form and position only intermittently: namely, when it participates in the production of a phenomenon.
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ADDENDUM (from the Author's answer to a Referee's criticism)
(1) My starting point [in this study] was Reichenbach's book [2] , whose characterization of the wave-particle dualism I adopted. From his analysis in terms of interphenomena, Reichenbach proceeds to offer his own interpretation of quantum mechanics (in terms of threevalued logic), while I proceeded to develop the alternative view of discontinuous spatiality. If the reader misses a direct comparison of my ideas with Bohr's work, or with the Copenhagen interpretation, my excuse is that such a comparison could not be done briefly enough to fit the paper's objective. References to that pioneer work are of course found in [2] .
The referee suggested that my idea be tested against the famous Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen paradox. But EPR has such a vast literature, that I would rather respond to a limited, newly formulated EPR-like objection.
(2) The paper does suggest that the wave and particle interpretations are both applicable to a given quantum mechanical situation. Again I am following Reichenbach ( § 7 of [2] ). The choice between the two pictures in individual cases is made on the basis of convenience. And let me add that practicing scientists do not rely much on such pictures, since we have precisely formulated operational rules: see, for example, Chapter 3 in Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu, and Laloë's Mécanique Quantique (Hermann, Paris, 1973).
(3) Reichenbach ( § 6 of [2] ) does assume that macroscopic data are directly observable, while microscopic phenomena are only indirectly inferable. The referee seems to see a difficulty in the thesis of discontinuous spatiality, on the ground that an observational device is made up of micro-systems, and thus would not have a continuous spatiality either. But macro-objects may be said to be the product of such an overwhelming flow of micro-phenomena, that its classical spatiality is assured. (A logical circle is perhaps unavoidable in the reductionist attitude, macroscopic things being ultimately defined in terms of each other.)
The critic has also asked why my sugestion would be preferable to the conventional language. Having recently become acquainted with Porchat Pereira's philosophy (in Manuscrito, October 1979, pp. 115-149), I answer that the idea of discontinuous spatiality is more easily harmonized with Western common sense than is the dualistic language. For the latter is linked to the fake reality of interphenomena, which are tautologically unobservable; while the former is more directly related to sense experience.
6. This is a qualitative content of the well known assertion that the state function ψ gives a probability amplitude, not a wave amplitude. See also Section IV.3 in W. Heisenberg, Physikalische Prinzipien der Quantentheorie, Bibliographisches Institut Mannheim (Germany), 1958.
7. In practice electron diffraction is obtained by the passage of an electron beam through a crystal.
8. Despite Reichenbach's naming of the abstract views as "restrictive interpretations" (p. 33 of [2] ).
9. Namely, quantum phenomena too can be predicted only in probability terms.
10. Or no spatiality at all; in this alternative view only events or phenomena would have place. It is expedient, however, to make the electron and other such 'particles' appear in the spots where phenomena take place, which are described as resulting from their interactions.
11. After completion of this work, my attention has been called to a possible relation between the idea presented here and Margenau's concept of "latent observable." See H. Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality (Sec. 8.2), McGraw-Hill, New York, l950.
